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THE NATURE OF CHINESE AGGRESSION AGAINST  
INDIA IN THE NEXT DECADE

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2 January 1972

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# STUDENT ESSAY

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## THE NATURE OF CHINESE AGGRESSION AGAINST INDIA IN THE NEXT DECADE

BY

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## ABSTRACT

Author: James W. Hamersly, Col, CE  
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The object is to predict China's actions versus India during the next ten years. A literature search was conducted in gathering the supporting information. Although South Asia per se is a relatively low priority area, it gains its importance vis' a vis Iran and the Persian Gulf area. After establishing the physical context of China and the relations between India and China, psychological considerations were applied to the total environment in forecasting China's posture. During the period 1972 through 1976, it is believed that China will cautiously employ subtle, non-dramatic strategies as she builds her economy and strategic power. From 1977 through 1981, with a higher level of strategic capability, she will take over Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and NEFA. Suggested U.S. policies include cautiously normalizing relations with China and shifting more responsibility to the Asians. And, also, using the opportunities created by the recent India-Pakistan war to strengthen our ability to defend the oil-rich areas to the West.

## INTRODUCTION

In reporting to the Congress on our foreign policy for the 1970's, President Nixon placed particular emphasis on the psychological factor. He pointed out that the communist threats we now face are predominately a "subtle mix of military, psychological, and political pressures"<sup>1</sup> and that in pursuing the challenges inherent in the Nixon Doctrine a significant degree of "psychological reorientation"<sup>2</sup> will be required. Similarly, others have noted that psychological influences are more predominate and constant than physical ones; that unexpected wars and national problems accrue from inadequate knowledge and distorted views that governments have of themselves, of other nations, and of the world situation; and that foundations which support war theories should be as broad and as encompassing as possible.<sup>3,4</sup>

Can psychological considerations contribute to better forecasting of international behavior? Kelman contends that psychological analyses can be contributing if they are considered in their

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<sup>1</sup>Richard M. Nixon, US Foreign Policy for the 1970's; Building For Peace, A Report to the Congress, (25 February 1971), p. 4.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 11.

<sup>3</sup>Quincy Wright, A Study of War (1965), p. 35.

<sup>4</sup>B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, (1967), p. 24.

appropriate places as "a part" of the overall international context.<sup>5</sup>

It should be pointed out that this attempt to determine Communist China's actions against India employs psychological factors along with historical relations and other elements of national power. Obviously in a paper of this length, it is not possible to cover the pertinent areas adequately nor to properly define Kissinger's "total situation".<sup>6</sup> While elements of India's national power will have some influence on future Chinese actions they are not considered to be controlling and have been omitted. Also, no attempt has been made to investigate individual Chinese leaders.

Throughout this essay the words China and Chinese refer to Communist China and Communist Chinese.

### PSYCHOLOGICAL

Psychological force has been an important element of power to the Chinese Communists and they have employed it effectively. In

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<sup>5</sup>Herbert C. Kelman, International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis (1965), p. 7. Kelman further avers that in developing concepts concerning the causes of war, it is necessary to start with relationships between nations rather than from individual human characteristics. p. 5. In this regard, Daniel Katz, in reporting on the resolution and denial of international conflicts, notes that newly developing nations are usually highly sensitive to insults to their national symbols and that nations enjoying the status quo, as well as weak nations, often try to avoid conflicts by minimizing possible hostile acts of other nations. pp. 378-379.

<sup>6</sup>Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (1957), p. 150.

starting from an initial position of weakness, they used such pressure to good advantage in taking over the Chinese mainland. And they used it again, in taking over and subjugating Tibet and in the seizure of Indian territories. The Chinese successfully employed psychological factors in gaining a position of respect and authority in the United Nations -- a position incongruous with their development. And they have continued to use this force for controlling the Chinese people and for manipulating the world environment.

Can we, then, make the forces of psychology more effectively serve our national security objectives and world peace? Can we reap the benefits of the Chinese proverb, paraphrased by Mao Tse-tung: "Know your enemy and know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster?"<sup>7</sup> Generally, it is difficult for Americans to understand the Chinese. "A priori reasoning as to what the Chinese ought to be is one thing; careful observation of what they actually are is quite another."<sup>8</sup> There are many parts to this problem: our own wishful thinking as to what we want them to be, authors' points of observation and their depths of interest, the particular era, the Chinese themselves, and the element of change.

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<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p.345.

<sup>8</sup>Arthur H. Smith, Chinese Characteristics (1894), p. 319.

Due to the size and diversity of the Chinese populace, character analyses must necessarily be suspect.<sup>9,10</sup> Even though they cannot possibly apply to all Chinese, such imperfect information "may have a significant heuristic role in interpreting and predicting Chinese behavior and strategy in the modern world."<sup>11</sup>

Specific characteristics which comprise the total Chinese nature may be contradictory, one to the other, or they may be supporting -- depending upon the total situation. Over the centuries, many who have studied and worked with the Chinese have observed large numbers of them to be energetic, purposeful, persistent, industrious, ingenuous, thrifty, patient, cheerful, reasonable, prudent, law-abiding, and in possession of a strong propensity for face and the time concept.<sup>12</sup> On the other hand, many less desirable character traits have been noted to be ever present. The Chinese are, depending upon the situation, insincere; treacherous; devious; suspicious of superiors and subordinates alike; superficial; fearful of and tending to be influenced by superior force; cruel and lacking compassion, mercy, kindness, and sympathy; and having a penchant for humiliating the weak, deformed and lame. They are also profoundly

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<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 11.

<sup>10</sup>Howard L. Boorman and Scott A. Boorman, "Strategy and National Psychology in China," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, (March 1967), p. 154.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 155.

<sup>12</sup>Bhaban: Sen Gupta, The Fulcrum of Asia, (1970), pp. 96, 301.

xenophobic and ethnocentric.<sup>13,14</sup> Of the above characteristics, three should be emphasized: Face, Time, and Treachery.

Face: "Face is strategic self-respect,"<sup>15</sup> it is "status, prestige, or recognition in the eyes of others. The audience is always the operative factor."<sup>16</sup> The hard facts of the case, as well as justice, are frequently ignored as people try to enhance their prestige and self-respect. Because the government requires complete subservience, in order to maintain national slavery and "pure" communism, the idea of face cannot be tolerated. Even though the denigrating and humiliating public confessions attempt to overcome the concept of face,<sup>17</sup> it is still important to individual Chinese.

Time: The Chinese concept of time supports the strategy of protracted conflict.<sup>18</sup> It also helps the Chinese to persist and to work toward objectives for unusually long periods.<sup>19</sup> According to Han Suyin, devout Chinese communist: "History, in the Chinese sense, has always implied continuity rather than merely a study of bygone days; past, present, and future form a single time entity,

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<sup>13</sup>Smith, pp. 16-19, 61-66, 99-100, 148-162, 194-197, 214-243, 266, 279, 290, 316.

<sup>14</sup>Sita Ram Johri, Major, Indian Army, (Ret'd). India Accepts China's Challenge, (1963), p. 294.

<sup>15</sup>Boorman, p. 147.

<sup>16</sup>Peggy Durbin, "'Face' Still Matters -- Everywhere," The New York Times Magazine, (September 1960), p. 58.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 61.

<sup>18</sup>R. G. Boyd, Communist China's Foreign Policy, (1962), p. 90.

<sup>19</sup>Gupta, p. 96.

and this notion of historical time as a human dimension is fundamental to the Chinese cultural concept."<sup>20</sup>

Treachery: For the most part, the Chinese are basically untrustworthy, and generally, are insincere to themselves and to others. They seek to take advantage of others with whom they have made bargains, and they are most willing to best the gods to whom they pray.<sup>21</sup> They can be expected to honor a treaty if it suits their strategies and if they are militarily weaker than the other party. In the face of superior force, they are prudent<sup>22</sup> and often resort to a superficial show of compliance.<sup>23</sup> The Chinese are not inclined to trust others and the government is not only suspicious of foreigners but of their own citizens as well.<sup>24</sup> Through design, they mislead or confuse others and they have a talent for creating and exploiting misunderstandings.<sup>25</sup>

In summary, the Chinese exhibit some traits which we respect and we find them to be a somewhat appealing people. We tend to want to like them. We are impressed by the suffering and the humil-

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<sup>20</sup>Han Suyin, China in the Year 2001, (1967), p. 6.

<sup>21</sup>Smith, pp. 302,316.

<sup>22</sup>Franklin W. Houn, A Short History of Chinese Communism, (1967), p. 279.

<sup>23</sup>Kathryn F. Allison and Robert B. Johnson, Communist China: Socio-Political Relationships and Trends to 1985, (1967), p. 45.

<sup>24</sup>Smith, p. 243-244.

<sup>25</sup>Smith, p. 61, 66.

iation which they have endured at the hands of foreigners and as a result of their own governments. And we are literally amazed by their ability and willingness to absorb such treatment in a cheerful manner and to do so, patiently, over generations of time. In any event, when judging matters of importance, their less admirable and less honorable characteristics should not be overlooked and neither should their ability to hide profound hate with love and cheerfulness be overlooked. Since these traits apply under certain conditions to a significant portion of the population, they merit our consideration.

#### OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES

China seeks to acquire economic and military power and attendant international prestige,<sup>26</sup> she intends to regain Asian territories previously held by the great Chinese empire,<sup>27</sup> and she plans to gain political control of Asia.<sup>28</sup> Apparently the Chinese "assume a heaven-sent right to rule such territories contiguous to China as

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<sup>26</sup>Ralph L. Powell, Communist China's Military Doctrines, (1967), p. 7.

<sup>27</sup>John B. McKinney, Colonel, and Douglas Kinnard, Colonel, "Communist China's Foreign Objectives," Army, (January 1967), pp. 21-27.

<sup>28</sup>Kenneth T. Young, Jr., "Asia's Disequilibrium and American Strategies." in United States and Communist China, ed. by William W. Lockwood, p. 46.

they consider important."<sup>29</sup> China also intends to insure her security against external forces<sup>30</sup> and to incite and support revolutionary activities and wars of national liberation throughout the world.<sup>31,32</sup> Particularly, China desires to successfully employ these techniques against nations on her periphery that reject her leadership and ideology.<sup>33</sup> The Chinese view the Indian environment as a threat and China is aware that her influence in Asia would be hampered by the competition provided by a powerful, democratic India.<sup>34</sup> In China's mind, it is, therefore, feasible to keep India preoccupied with border problems which will serve to weaken her economy.<sup>35</sup> China believes, however, that her greatest danger in the Indian context lies in the threatening presence of the United States and Soviet Russia.<sup>36</sup>

The Chinese are great strategists and they "attach a very high priority to a correct appraisal of the world situation."<sup>37</sup> They tenaciously pursue their objectives over exceptionally long periods

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<sup>29</sup>Drew Middleton, America's Stake in Asia, (1968), p. 202.

<sup>30</sup>McKinney, p. 21.

<sup>31</sup>John B. McKinney, Colonel, "Red China's Strategic Options," Marine Corps Gazette, (June 1969), p. 43.

<sup>32</sup>Powell, p. 7.

<sup>33</sup>McKinney, Marine Corps Gazette, (June 1969), p. 44.

<sup>34</sup>Middleton, p. 129.

<sup>35</sup>Patwant Singh, India and the Future of Asia, (1966), p. 162.

<sup>36</sup>Norman D. Palmer, Recent Soviet and Chinese Penetration in India and Pakistan: Guidelines for Political and Military Policy, (1970), p. 58.

<sup>37</sup>Morton Halperin, "China's Strategic Outlook." in China and the Peace of Asia, ed. by Alastair Buchan, p. 96.

of time,<sup>38</sup> and they are extremely flexible in selecting strategic methods. Chinese strategy is manipulative. To achieve their ends, the Chinese employ a wide spectrum of means and they endeavor "to manipulate an entire set of variables . . .: the enemy commander's mind; his self-image; his face; the enemy view of the situation and of its objective potentialities; the psychology of the opposing army: and so on." Chinese strategy favors encircling an enemy from all directions. The Chinese "figuratively encircle their opponent by pressing him psychologically from several encircling points."<sup>39</sup>

The specific strategies they employ, at any point in time, are, indeed, consonant with existing concurrent situations and circumstances. Since China's strategic power is minute in comparison with the strategic power of the United States and Soviet Russia, she intends to "avoid a Sino-American war at all costs"<sup>40</sup> and is employing a "low risk indirect confrontation strategy."<sup>41</sup> One example of this is the "sanctuary warfare of political proxies" strategy.<sup>42</sup> In order to correct her strategic weakness and to provide an economy which is adequate to support the development of suitable delivery systems

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<sup>38</sup>Sir Robert Scott, "Conflict and Coexistence in Asia: A British Perspective." in China and the Peace of Asia, ed. by Alastair Buchan, p. 52.

<sup>39</sup>Boorman, pp. 149-152.

<sup>40</sup>McKinney, p. 43.

<sup>41</sup>Ishwer C. Ojha, "China's Cautious American Policy, "Current History, (September 1967), p. 140.

<sup>42</sup>Young, p.46.

and larger stocks of nuclear weapons, China hopes to increase trade with the West.<sup>43</sup> China's "peaceful co-existence" strategy was contrived to give China a peaceful and defensive image as she actively pursued her hostile struggle against Western influence.<sup>44</sup> Under this policy, rimland nations could enjoy peace with China by repudiating the United States and accepting Chinese leadership and ideology. Regardless of the image that China succeeds in creating, " . . . force and violence remain central to the entire Chinese concept of the course of history political change, and the application of ideology to the analyses of government and society."<sup>45</sup>

#### SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS

Fear and confusion was the genesis of the myth: a two-thousand-year friendship between India and China. Actually, the two countries, knew very little about each other.<sup>46</sup> They became nation states about the same time, each had experienced Western Imperialism,<sup>47</sup> both wanted to secure their borders, and both wanted to assume the leadership of the Asian nations.<sup>48</sup> Nehru was aware of China's expansionist nature,<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>43</sup>McKinney, p.43.

<sup>44</sup>Boyd, pp. 92-93.

<sup>45</sup>Fred Greene, US Policy and the Security of Asia, (1968), p. 125.

<sup>46</sup>Gupta, pp. 21-22, 104, 139, 303.

<sup>47</sup>Palmer, p. 49.

<sup>48</sup>Winston Edson Langley, India and China, 1949-1959: A Competitive Relationship. Thesis (Howard University, 15 May 1969), p. 39.

<sup>49</sup>Singh, p. 180.

and being also aware of India's military weakness, he decided the best course for India was to contain China through friendship.<sup>50, 51</sup> Since China felt that a friendly posture would not encumber her, she went along with the arrangement. Through this facade, India gained twelve years, during which she could have built up her forces.<sup>52</sup> China seized Tibet in 1950 and India did not act with force.<sup>53</sup>

Aware of China's success in Korea, against United States forces, India felt unable to oppose her in Tibet.<sup>54</sup> China had succeeded in creating, in India's mind, a psychological situation which Mr. Hart has described:

On a higher plane of warfare, the impression made on the mind of the opposing commander can nullify the whole fighting power that his troops possess. And on a still higher plane, psychological pressure on the government of a country may suffice to cancel all resources at his command -- so the sword drops from a paralyzed hand.<sup>55</sup>

In 1954, China and India had vague understandings about an autonomous Tibet<sup>56</sup> and nothing specific was worked out on the China-India boundaries. China constructed a road in the Aksai Chin area of Ladakh on Indian territory, constructed other roads and positions

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<sup>50</sup>Ibid., p. 125.

<sup>51</sup>V. C. Trivedi, "The Defense of India." in China and the Peace of Asia, ed. by Alastair Buchan, p. 129.

<sup>52</sup>Singh, p. 127.

<sup>53</sup>Singh, p. 126.

<sup>54</sup>Langley, pp. 51-52.

<sup>55</sup>Hart, p. 228.

<sup>56</sup>Langley, p. 237.

for military use and issued maps showing Indian areas as belonging to China.<sup>57</sup> In the heat of the competition, India and China frequently insulted each other. In 1958, Nehru humiliated Mao Tse-tung by attacking Mao's "let a hundred flowers bloom" program as existing for the purpose of executing those who opposed the regime.<sup>58</sup> China penetrated Indian territories every year between 1957 and 1962. In 1962, China succeeded in taking large areas in Ladakh and NEFA.<sup>59</sup> Since then, India has regained its confidence and with Soviet help has increased its combat power. India wants to maintain its borders intact and, while it wants adequate security against Chinese aggression,<sup>60</sup> it desires peace with China.<sup>61</sup> India looks, first, to the Soviet Union for strategic nuclear protection, and then, to the United States.<sup>62</sup>

#### POLITICAL

Around 1964, O. Edmund Clubb found China to be unified and politically strong.<sup>63</sup> In 1966, other researchers detected submissiveness and insincerity among the populace instead of unity.<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> Palmer, p. 46.

<sup>58</sup> Langley, p. 164.

<sup>59</sup> Som D. Dutt, Major-General, Indian Army (Ret'd), The Defense of India's Northern Borders, (1966), p. 4.

<sup>60</sup> Greene, p. 305.

<sup>61</sup> Palmer, p. 18.

<sup>62</sup> Hanson W. Baldwin, Strategy for Tomorrow, (1970), p. 217.

<sup>63</sup> Edmund O. Clubb, Twentieth Century China, (1964), p. 423.

<sup>64</sup> Allison, p. 45.

Then the cultural revolution began, and one significant result of this well-engineered epoch was the strengthening of Mao Tse-tung's regime. This totalitarian administration, as a powerful, central authority, freely directs national efforts and resources as it deems proper for China. And it does so without being plagued -- as India is plagued -- by groups and cliques with divergent interests. In China, there are no obnoxious dissenters and there are few competing and outspoken regions.<sup>65</sup> There is also in China almost no freedom. The Chinese people are controlled by force and fear -- fear which is engendered and perpetuated through maintaining, continually, an "atmosphere of war."

While Mao's regime is effective, it is also dedicated to the destruction of every vestige of opposition which it finds threatening.<sup>66</sup> There have been a few changes and " . . . the new leadership that is emerging in China . . . is a coalition or collective of radicals, moderates, and pragmatists."<sup>67</sup> This seems to suggest that China will thrust for the same objectives, with the same degree of internal hostility, but more subtly and with more astute strategies.

#### ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

China's economy is one of her weakest links.<sup>68</sup> It fails to

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<sup>65</sup> Singh, p.184.

<sup>66</sup> George F. Kennan, "The United States and the Communist Giants." in United States and Communist China, ed. by William W. Lockwood, p. 65.

<sup>67</sup> Gupta, p. 283.

<sup>68</sup> McKinney, p. 43.

adequately provide for the ever expanding population, it retards the rate of modernization, and it limits China's strategies -- forcing the nation into an essentially defensive military posture.<sup>69, 70</sup> If it is true, as reported, that "food supplies on the mainland will have to double in the next ten years if the present level of nourishment is to be maintained,"<sup>71</sup> then China's economy may dictate some of her national policies. Although the agriculturally-oriented economy, in terms of volume, is one of the largest in the world,<sup>72</sup> development is retarded in both the agricultural and industrial sectors.<sup>73</sup> Food production is crucially insufficient and other deficiencies exist in materials, critical resources, and skilled manpower.<sup>74</sup>

But there is no deficiency in the freedom afforded by the totalitarian system as the leaders are able to easily direct support and resources to the selected priority effort.<sup>75, 76</sup> Development and production of strategic weaponry carries a high priority and

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<sup>69</sup>Allison, p. 82.

<sup>70</sup>Michael B. Yahuda, "China's Military Capabilities," Current History (September 1969), p. 144.

<sup>71</sup>"When Red China Becomes a Nuclear Superpower," U.S. News & World Report, 27 September 1971, p. 47.

<sup>72</sup>Allison, p. 81.

<sup>73</sup>Scott, p. 52.

<sup>74</sup>Lucian W. Pye, "Political Leadership and Revolutionary Power in Communist China," in United States and Communist China, ed. by William W. Lockwood, p. 15.

<sup>75</sup>Samuel B. Griffith, "The Military Potential of China," in China and the Peace of Asia, ed. by Alastair Buchan, p. 68.

<sup>76</sup>S. M. Chiu, "China's Military Posture," Current History, (September 1967), p. 156.

the results are surprisingly successful. In China's marginal economic situation, these successes are accruing at the expense of the masses who are ruthlessly exploited.<sup>77</sup>

Such exploitation is expected to continue until China has "an independent, industrialized, highly self-sufficient economy, on a 'socialist' basis, with a substantial war potential."<sup>78</sup> China diligently works toward these goals and she needs economic help,<sup>79</sup> "plants, machine tools, technical assistance, and many other products of modern industry."<sup>80</sup>

A review of China's economic history from 1949 through 1964,<sup>81</sup> clearly shows that the Chinese learned from their mistakes of the "Great Leap" strategy, took corrective action, and regained their self-confidence. In 1964, China's annual economic growth rate increased about 5% and her population increased approximately 2½%.<sup>82</sup> In addition, economic gains were achieved by revising the organizational structure of the communes from a monolithic type commune to a team-brigade type commune.

Other respectable gains should be realized, later, from the United States' steps, taken in 1970, to lift various export and

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<sup>77</sup>Helmunt G. Callis, China, Asia and the West (1960), p. 14.

<sup>78</sup>Boyd, p. 16.

<sup>79</sup>McKinney, p. 47.

<sup>80</sup>McKinney, Army (January 1967), p. 27.

<sup>81</sup>Alexander Eckstein, "Economic Progress of Communist China," in United States and Communist China, ed. by William W. Lockwood, pp. 2-6.

<sup>82</sup>Dick Wilson, "China's Economic Prospects," in Contemporary China, ed. by Ruth Adams, pp. 191-192.

travel restrictions on China.<sup>83</sup> And Edwin O. Reischauer noted that: "No longer do Chinese or Americans look on the other as a dangerous foe."<sup>84</sup> At this time, apparently, economics "prevails over politics" and China is seeking to build up her economic strength.<sup>85</sup>

### MILITARY POWER

Although "China has significant ability to promote and support subversion and insurgency in peripheral areas"<sup>86</sup> and has made impressive achievements in developing her nuclear capacity,<sup>87</sup> her current military posture is essentially defensive.<sup>88</sup> This posture is compatible with her practice of keeping military doctrines and strategies tailored to the extant environment, to her internal strengths and weaknesses and to the capabilities of her adversaries.<sup>89</sup> The defensive strategy is particularly in harmony with her relatively weak economy.<sup>90</sup> But even with her inadequate economy, China has a large ground force. According to Melvin R. Laird, China has the largest land military force in the world.<sup>91</sup> Most sources agree that China's

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<sup>83</sup>Nixon, p. 109.

<sup>84</sup>Edwin O. Reischauer, "Yes to China Must Not Be No to Japan," Life, (10 September 1971), p. 4.

<sup>85</sup>McKinney, Army, (January 1967), p. 23.

<sup>86</sup>Melvin R. Laird, Statement of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the FY 1972-1976 Defense Program and the 1972 Defense Budget, (15 March 1971), p. 52.

<sup>87</sup>Yahuda, p. 147.

<sup>88</sup>Chiu, p. 60.

<sup>89</sup>Powell, p. 28.

<sup>90</sup>Yahuda, p. 144.

<sup>91</sup>Laird, p. 52.

ability to conduct successful military aggression beyond her borders is limited<sup>92, 93</sup> and that it is unlikely she will conduct conventional military operations on two borders simultaneously.<sup>94</sup>

This limited stance is humiliating to China and is inconsistent with her objectives. In China's mind, strategic power is imperative for survival and international respect. And she is aware that only by using nuclear weapons can other nations breach her defenses and defeat her.<sup>95</sup> She fears profoundly that the Soviets will attack China and, thus, prevent her full development. This apprehension has been demonstrated by the vast quantities of limited resources that China has willingly poured into the development of nuclear weapons and delivery systems<sup>96</sup> and the main thrust of her technology has been in strategic development.<sup>97</sup> From these efforts, it is expected that China will acquire the initial capability of deploying ICBM's during the period 1973 to 1975 and late in the decade will have significant numbers of operable ICBM's.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>92</sup>Joseph S. Clark, "Asia and the Prospects for World Order," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, (July 1970), p. 30.

<sup>93</sup>Alastair Buchan, China and the Peace of Asia, (1965), pp. 87-89.

<sup>94</sup>Laird, p. 52.

<sup>95</sup>C. P. Fitzgerald, "China In Asia," Current History, (September 1967), p. 134.

<sup>96</sup>Allison, p. 66.

<sup>97</sup>Baldwin, p. 66.

<sup>98</sup>Laird, pp. 47-48.

## GEOGRAPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The India-China area being considered is dominated by the barrier of the Himalayan massif -- the world's highest mountain system. The Himalayan range separates India and Tibet. Moving northward from the Indian plains, which are around one thousand feet above sea level, the mountains rise over five miles -- to Mount Everest (29,141 feet) -- and level off at about seventeen thousand feet on the plateau of Tibet which is over three miles above the Indian plains.

India's northern border is rife with avenues of approach into India. Most of the approaches are along mountain passes and require an incredible logistic effort to negotiate. From the invader's point of view, depending upon the season, some routes are more feasible than others. The approach through the Chumbi Valley and the route through Nagaland are considered to be the most threatening to India.<sup>99, 100, 101</sup>

The military build-up of Tibet, and areas along Tibet's southern frontier, is consistent with China's flexible strategies and long range objectives. Facilities constructed in these areas were expensively engineered for permanency and heavy-duty usage and they include extensive road networks, bases and supply centers,

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<sup>99</sup>Dutt, pp. 2-4.

<sup>100</sup>Singh, pp. 214-215.

<sup>101</sup>Baldwin, p. 203.

airfields, communication systems, etc.<sup>102, 103</sup> These facilities are consistent with China's strategies of sanctuary warfare by political proxies<sup>104</sup> and wars of national liberation; they will also support future Chinese probes and penetrations into India.

### CONCLUSIONS

During the next ten years, if a general nuclear war can be averted, and if the relationships among the United States, China, and the Soviets can be maintained devoid of war, then, China has four basic opportunities open to her concerning India. These opportunities include: conducting a major invasion deep into India; making small, probing, limited-objective attacks against India; supporting indigenous insurgency forces and promoting revolutions in Indian border areas; and increasing nuclear strategic power and using this power, by threat or actual force, against India. A sincere posture of peace is not included as an opportunity, because China is considered to be incapable of taking such a stance.

It is expected that China will employ all of these measures, except the major invasion, during the next ten years; her posture versus India will be one of subtle, prudent aggression. From 1972 through 1976, it is estimated that China will act with caution, so

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<sup>102</sup>Dutt, p. 3.

<sup>103</sup>Buchan, pp. 133-138.

<sup>104</sup>Young, pp. 46-47.

as to avoid being attacked by the Soviets, but will provoke India with probing attacks and by inciting and supporting insurgent actions and revolutions. She will thrust to strengthen her economy and nuclear strategic forces. During the period 1977 through 1981, it is envisioned that China, with adequate delivery systems and a suitable number of ICBM's, will become more adventurous. Although still strategically weak in comparison to the U.S. and the Soviets, China will have the capability of destroying cities in both countries. With this capability, and knowing the state of public concern in the U.S. and U.S.S.R. with their large, vulnerable urban populations, consistent with her objectives, China will begin to establish suzerainty over Burma, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and Assam. China's posture will be one of callous hostility.

As stated, a major invasion is considered unlikely for a number of reasons. First: such a move would likely result in the destruction of China's progress by the Soviets. Secondly: such a move would injure relations with the U.S. and result in the loss of such economic benefits as trade and, possibly, aid. Damage to China's economical and industrial development would also retard the growth of strategic power -- the key, in China's mind, to international prestige and respect. Third: China's limited resources are incapable of supporting strategic development and major offenses simultaneously. Fourth: the Himalayan barrier poses extreme logistical problems to the massing and movement of large forces. It

favors India, instead of China, in the supporting and reinforcing of forces. Fifth: the answer to China's food problem does not lie in expansionism nor in the northern Indian plains. The solution involves a wider use of scientific agricultural methods, fast industrialization, drastic birth control measures, aid, and increased world trade.

Conducting small probing attacks against India and supporting insurrections and revolutions in border areas are not likely to provoke the United States nor the U.S.S.R. Also, these efforts require minimal resources, offer limitless opportunities for creating and maintaining a continual state of trouble, will weaken India's economy by forcing her to spend large sums for the defense of remote, vulnerable areas and will cause India to be encircled by hostile states.

These forecasts are considered to be consistent with China's strategies and objectives. Also, they appear to be consonant with certain Chinese psychological traits, previously mentioned, which are expected to be over-riding in the particular relationship and physical contexts described.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS


U.S. policy must, of course, reflect broad strategic evaluations and cannot be limited to China's and India's influences alone in South Asia. Even though the balance of power in South Asia favors

Soviet Russia and India, the real winner of the recent India-Pakistan war was the United States who has new, unprecedented opportunities open to her. The U.S. is in a flexible and justifiable position: it can ignore South Asia or it can select a definite course which includes it. Through their aid and other influencing assistance to India, which made the December 1971 victory certain, the Soviets will in the future most likely acquire strategic base rights. Along with this favorable probability, they have also inherited the economic responsibility of supporting the Bangla Desh nation as well as India. This could force the Soviets to decelerate their build-up of strategic power. An immediate, massive invasion of Iran and the Persian Gulf area could make it all worthwhile, but the Soviets have not yet achieved the overwhelming superiority of national power, over the U.S., that they require. Pakistan, after shunning the U.S. and turning to China, has realized her mistake and she will likely be more amenable to U.S. wishes in the future. China prudently accepted humiliation instead of opposing the superior force of the U.S.S.R.

On the one hand, Pakistan has much to offer toward providing depth and support to U.S. forces in a campaign to protect Iran and the Persian Gulf area. On the other hand, we do not wish to be linked with China and Pakistan in their subversion of India, nor do we wish to be in a vulnerable position if India attacks Pakistan. It appears that now is the time for decision. In the interest of

world peace, the following recommendations are made for consideration:

1. Cautiously, normalize relations with China and continue relaxing her encirclement by gradually shifting responsibility to the Asians.
2. If Pakistan agrees to our terms, immediately provide her with massive military and economic aid. Provide no aid, or very minimal aid, to India and Bangla Desh.
3. If the Soviets place forces in India, establish a significant military presence in Pakistan.

  
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